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STATE REGULATORY EFFORTS IN PROTECTING A 
SURROGATE’S BODILY AUTONOMY 
Alexus Williams* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The field of infertility and assisted reproductive technology (ART)1 has 
made incredible strides throughout the last forty years.  Starting with the first 
human born by in vitro fertilization (IVF) in 1978,2 researchers of fertility 
treatment have made relentless efforts in adapting ART technology to meet 
numerous couples’ unique needs.3  Just recently, in December 2017, the 
United States welcomed the first live birth of a baby to a woman who had a 
uterine transplant.4  Due to these major, innovative developments in ART, 
countless individuals throughout the world have actualized their dreams of 
starting a family.5  According to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s (CDC) 2016 Fertility Clinic Success Rates Report, there were 
263,577 ART cycles performed,6 resulting in 65,996 live born infants in that 
year alone.7  “Today, approximately 1.7% of all infants born in the United 
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 1  ART is defined as “[a]ll treatments or procedures that include the handling of human 
eggs or embryos to help a woman become pregnant.”  2015 Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Fertility Clinic Success Rates Report, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 531 
(2017), ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/art/ART-2015-Clinic-Report-Full.pdf.   
 2  S. Shivaji, The Journey of R. G. Edwards: From a Single Cell to Louise Joy Brown, 
100 CURRENT SCI. 488, 488 (2011).  On July 25, 1978, Louise Joy Brown became the first 
human to have been born after conception by IVF.  Id. 
 3  See ART Success Rates, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2018). 
 4  Madison Park, Baby Is First to Be Born in US After Uterus Transplant, Hospital Says, 
CNN (Dec. 4, 2017, 4:54 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/04/health/uterus-transplant-
us-baby-birth/index.html. 
 5  See ART Success Rates, supra note 3.  
 6  “ART cycles include any process in which (1) an ART procedure is performed, (2) a 
woman has undergone ovarian stimulation or monitoring with the intent of having an ART 
procedure, or (3) frozen embryos have been thawed with the intent of transferring them to a 
woman.”  2015 Assisted Reproductive Technology Fertility Clinic Success Rates Report, 
supra note 1. 
 7  ART Success Rates, supra note 3. 
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States every year are conceived using ART.”8 
Advancements in reproductive biotechnology have created 
complicated legal, ethical, and moral dilemmas.9  Among the myriad of 
fertility services, including hormonal therapy, artificial insemination, and 
gamete/zygote intrafallopian transfer, one of the most controversial methods 
of “reproduction has grown at an even greater rate than ART generally: the 
use of surrogate mothers.”10  This emerging area of reproductive technology 
has led to many surrogacy-related disputes. 
Despite the growing prevalence and availability of commercial 
surrogacy arrangements,11 the law of surrogate motherhood in the United 
States is currently in a state of confusion.12  In the United States, surrogacy 
is governed by a hodgepodge of contradictory state laws; some enforce 
surrogacy contracts, some ban them entirely, and some allow them under 
certain circumstances.13  Many states, however, do not have any laws 
regarding surrogacy contracts.14  The patchwork of legislation pertaining to 
surrogacy in the United States reflects the various ethical and practical 
concerns associated with this reproductive practice. 
There were numerous challenges to the legality of surrogacy when it 
first came into use.15  But now, as the practice has become more common, 
the legal issues have become more complex.16  Among the various problems 
pertaining to this form of ART, the surrogate’s decision-making authority is 
perhaps the most perplexing.  In 2015, a forty-seven-year-old California 
woman named Melissa Cook executed a gestational surrogacy contract with 
the intended parent and genetic father, known in the court filings as C.M.17  
 
 8  Id. 
 9  See infra Part II.  Discussion of this broad domain is well beyond the purview of this 
Comment, but it should be noted that the issues include topics such as the rights of fetuses, 
donors, and adoptive parents; the liability of physicians; patentable organisms; and other new 
developments in research. 
 10  Magdalina Gugucheva, Surrogacy in America, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, 
3 (2010), www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/kaevej0a1m.pdf; see 
BRETTE MCWHORTER SEMBER, THE COMPLETE ADOPTION & FERTILITY LEGAL GUIDE 197 (1st 
ed. 2004).  The number of gestational surrogate cycles increased from 2,251 in 2006 to 4,725 
in 2015 (a 110% increase), while the number of ART cycles performed only increased from 
138,198 in 2006 to 182,154 in 2015 (a 32% increase).  2015 Assisted Reproductive 
Technology National Summary Report, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 50, 53 
(2017), https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2015-report/ART-2015-National-Summary-Report.pdf.   
 11  See infra Part II.B.  
 12  Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-807 (2013), with LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:286 
(2016). 
 13  See infra Part IV.  
 14  See infra Part IV. 
 15  See infra Part II.A.  
 16  See infra Part II; see also infra Part III. 
 17  Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 928 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th 
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The surrogacy agreement spanned seventy-five pages and included a 
selective reduction clause, in which one or more of the fetuses in a multiple 
pregnancy could be terminated.18  Because of Cook’s advanced age, the 
doctor implanted three male embryos into her uterus to increase the chances 
that at least one would prove viable.19  In this case, all embryos survived.20  
Fearful that he would not be able to afford triplets, C.M. attempted to invoke 
the agreement’s selective reduction clause, asking Cook to reduce the 
pregnancy by one fetus.21  Cook, however, refused to do so, “citing her anti-
abortion beliefs.”22  The three babies were ultimately born and a hotly 
contested legal battle over parentage and the constitutionality of the 
California Parentage Act ensued between Cook and C.M.23  As Cook v. 
Harding24 illustrates, one of the issues plaguing surrogacy contracts is the 
question of decision-making.  In fact, it stresses the need for heightened 
clarity in limiting which autonomous rights a surrogate can waive in a 
surrogacy agreement. 
This Comment will analyze how different states regulate surrogacy 
issues.  Specifically, it will examine how these issues are regulated to protect 
a surrogate’s bodily autonomy.  Part II of this Comment will examine the 
history of surrogacy.  Next, Part III will discuss issues involving disputes 
about critical decision-making roles between the surrogate and the intended 
parents.  Part IV will detail the current surrogacy regulatory schemes among 
the states.  Finally, Part V will provide solutions wherever gaps or variations 
exist, and present a balancing test that can be implemented by the courts to 
determine the limitations of provisions that divest the surrogate of her 
autonomous, decision-making rights.  This Comment will ultimately argue 
that legislation should impose ample restrictions on specific rights that 
cannot be contracted away, such as the right to an abortion, as well as provide 
 
Cir. 2018).   
 18  Id. at 928−29. 
 19  Id. at 928. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. at 928–29.  
 22  Id.   
 23  See Cook, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 925.  The California Court of Appeal affirmed the 
Appellate Division of the Superior Court’s judgment enforcing the gestational surrogacy 
contract between Cook and C.M.  C.M. v. M.C., 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).  
The judgment cut off Cook’s parental rights to the three children in accordance with CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 7962.  Id. at 354.  Meanwhile, as the state proceeding continued, Cook filed a 
complaint against C.M. in the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California.  Cook, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 926.  The court held that the state judicial system 
provided an adequate outlet to seek relief, and therefore, dismissed the claim.  Id. at 938.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order.  Cook 
v. Harding, 879 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 24  190 F. Supp. 3d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2018).   
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the courts with a sufficient legal framework.25 
II. THE HISTORY OF SURROGACY AND ITS EVOLUTION 
Surrogacy is a form of ART commonly utilized by couples who desire 
to start families of their own, but otherwise lack the ability to do so.26  The 
rapid pace of advancements in reproductive technology has given infertile 
couples, same-sex couples, and single individuals ways to build a family 
through surrogacy.27  Surrogacy is defined as “[t]he process of carrying and 
delivering a child for another person.”28  The term “commercial surrogacy” 
is defined as “a contractual relationship where compensation is paid to a 
surrogate and agency . . . in exchange for the surrogate’s gestational 
services.”29  Although the term is new,30 the idea of surrogacy has been 
practiced for years—even tracing back to biblical times.31 
Commercial surrogacy implicates the bodily integrity of the surrogate 
and the rights of the intended parents to contract freely.32  This ultimately 
creates a tension between allowing the intended parents to make intrusive 
decisions for the surrogate mother, and ensuring that the surrogacy contract 
does not divest the surrogate of all autonomous, decision-making rights.33  
Before discussing the appropriate solution for this matter of contention, it is 
imperative to first explore the history and evolution of surrogacy. 
 
 25  Because the Legislature cannot imagine every scenario in which the surrogate’s 
autonomous decision-making rights could be compromised by a surrogacy agreement, the 
balancing test will provide the judiciary with guidance during disputes of first impression.   
 26  What is Surrogacy?, CIRCLE SURROGACY, https://www.circlesurrogacy.com/pages/ 
what-is-surrogacy (last visited July 17, 2018).  
 27  See infra Part II.B.  
 28  Surrogacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 29  Katherine Drabiak et al., Ethics, Law, and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for 
Uniformity, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 300, 301 (2007). 
 30  Modern surrogacy, as it is known today, has only been practiced for the last three 
decades.  About Surrogacy: From the Bible to Today: The History of Surrogacy, 
SURROGATE.COM, https://surrogate.com/about-surrogacy/surrogacy-101/history-of-
surrogacy/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).  It was not until 1980 that the first commercial 
surrogacy agreement was arranged between a traditional surrogate and the intended parents.  
Id.  Soon after, in 1985, the first successful gestational surrogacy was completed.  Id.  These 
historic developments paved the way for the contemporary notion of surrogacy.  Id.  
 31  In the Bible, when Sarah, Rachel, and Leah were infertile, they gave their 
handmaids—Hagar, Bilhah, and Zilpah—to have babies for their husbands.  Genesis 16:1–4, 
15; 30:1–10. 
 32  See Katherine B. Lieber, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of Surrogacy 
Be Answered?, 68 IND. L.J. 205, 226–27 (1992).  
 33  See Alayna Ohs, The Power of Pregnancy: Examining Constitutional Rights in a 
Gestational Surrogacy Contract, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 339, 355–56 (2002).  
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A. The Two Different Types of Surrogacy Arrangements 
There are two types of surrogacy arrangements: traditional surrogacy 
and gestational surrogacy.34  Traditional surrogacy was the first of the two 
procedures to be medically possible.35  It is defined as “[a] pregnancy in 
which a woman provides her own egg, which is fertilized by artificial 
insemination, and carries the fetus and gives birth to a child for another 
person.”36  Because this earlier type of surrogacy uses the surrogate’s own 
egg, a biological relationship is created with the child, which makes a 
stronger case for courts to determine that the birth mother is also the legal 
mother.37  Such reasoning led to decisions such as the Baby M case, bringing 
widespread attention to the procedure and possible legal complications that 
traditional surrogacy can entail.38 
In 1986, surrogacy encountered its first significant legal challenge in 
perhaps the most famous case in surrogacy history, the Baby M case,39 
involving a traditional surrogacy arrangement.  The facts of the case “riveted 
the attention of much of the country in the late 1980s” and exemplified why 
traditional surrogacy arrangements have since been avoided.40  The case 
arose from a contract entered into by William Stern and Mary Beth 
Whitehead in February 1985.41  Mr. Stern and his wife, Elizabeth Stern, 
 
 34  See Jennifer S. White, Gestational Surrogacy Contracts in Tennessee: Freedom of 
Contract Concerns & Feminist Principles in the Balance, 2 BELMONT L. REV. 269, 274 
(2015); see also RICKIE SOLINGER, REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO 
KNOW 108 (2013).  Surrogacy can take many forms, including: (1) a traditional surrogate 
mother who is both genetically related as well as carrying a child who has genetics from an 
intended father; (2) a traditional surrogate who uses donor sperm but is giving the child up to 
a different intended father and intended mother; (3) a gestational mother who has genetics 
from two donors but has two intended parents who will not be biologically related to the child; 
(4) a surrogate serving as a gestational mother who is impregnated with an intended parent’s 
sperm and an intended parent’s eggs; and (5) a gestational mother using genetics from one 
intended parent with help from a donor.  See Darra L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s 
Maybe:” A State-By-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 451 (2009). 
 35  See About Surrogacy: From the Bible to Today: The History of Surrogacy, supra note 
30.  
 36  Traditional Surrogacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 37  See Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 121−22 (2009); see also In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).  
 38  In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1227; see also In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 2014); 
Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998); A.L.S. ex rel. J.P. v. E.A.G., No. A10-443, 2010 
WL 4181449 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010).  
 39  In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1227; About Surrogacy: From the Bible to Today: The 
History of Surrogacy, supra note 30. 
 40  MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT MATTERS MOST 
IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAME-SEX AND 
UNWED PARENTS 102 (2002).  
 41  In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235. 
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hoped to have children and start a family of their own.42  Mrs. Stern feared 
that this, however, was beyond the bounds of possibility due to her multiple 
sclerosis, which made pregnancy dangerous and potentially life 
threatening.43  At first the Sterns considered adoption but became 
discouraged at the delays involved.44  As an alternative, the couple decided 
to use surrogacy.45 
Mr. Stern and Whitehead subsequently entered into a surrogacy 
contract in which Whitehead agreed to be artificially inseminated by Mr. 
Stern’s sperm and to carry the child for the couple.46  The contract contained 
terms indicating that Whitehead would surrender the child and, in return, 
would receive a $10,000 fee.47  The insemination was successful; Whitehead 
became pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl in March 1986.48 
After turning the baby over to the Sterns, Whitehead began to 
experience emotional difficulty.49  The next day, she begged the Sterns to let 
her temporarily take the baby, promising to return with her later.50  Fearful 
that in her state of distress Whitehead might harm herself, the Sterns allowed 
her to take the child.51  The next week, however, Whitehead called the Sterns 
and informed them that she had changed her mind and would not relinquish 
the baby.52  The Sterns proceeded to sue Whitehead in New Jersey state 
court, seeking enforcement of the surrogacy contract.53  After the judge 
entered an order requiring her to relinquish custody, Whitehead fled to 
Florida with Baby M.54  It was not until the end of July that Florida police 
invaded Whitehead’s home, forcibly removed the baby, and delivered the 
child back to the Sterns.55 
 
 
 
 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Id. at 1236.  The Sterns declined to adopt for two additional reasons: (1) Mr. Stern 
desired his genetics to live on, particularly because most of his family had been lost in the 
Holocaust, and (2) the Sterns saw a potential problem arising from their age and their differing 
religious backgrounds.  Id. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. at 1235. 
 47  In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235.  
 48  Id. at 1236.  Whitehead called the baby Sara; the Sterns called the baby Melissa.  Id.  
 49  Id.  
 50  Id. at 1237. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. 
 53  In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1237. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id.  
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When the Sterns regained possession of the child, the trial court 
reaffirmed the prior order requiring Whitehead to relinquish custody.56  The 
trial court held that the contract, by which Whitehead had agreed to bear the 
child for the Sterns, was valid and that Mr. Stern was the legal parent.57  
Whitehead appealed, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted direct 
certification.58  The Supreme Court of New Jersey invalidated the surrogacy 
contract on public policy grounds,59 holding the intended payment to be 
illegal60 and potentially degrading to women.61  The Court then used the legal 
standard of “the best interests of the child” for custody purposes, and 
determined that custody should be awarded to the Sterns.62 
In traditional surrogacy arrangements, like the contract entered into by 
Whitehead and Mr. Stern, the surrogate, whose egg is fertilized, is the true 
biological mother of the child, which makes a stronger case that she also has 
parental rights to the child.63  In these scenarios, to officially establish the 
intended parents as the child’s legal parents, the surrogate’s parental rights 
need to be terminated, and the genetically-unrelated intended parent needs 
to complete a stepparent adoption.64  Because of these additional legal 
complications, many surrogacy professionals stopped offering traditional 
surrogacy programs and instead moved toward the use of gestational 
surrogacy programs.65 
 
 56  Id.  
 57  Id. at 1237–38.  The trial court based a major part of its decision upon the view that 
custody with the Sterns was in the child’s best interests.  Id. at 1237.  The highly-publicized 
trial “entail[ed] six weeks of testimony and half a million dollars of legal bills.”  MARTHA A. 
FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN ISSUES 4 (1990).  
 58  In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1238.  
 59  Id. at 1246–49.  Specifically, the court found that surrogacy contracts were void 
because they violated policies concerning the consent of the surrogate to surrender the child.  
Id.  According to the court’s reasoning, “the natural mother is irrevocably committed before 
she knows the strength of her bond with her child.  She never makes a totally voluntary, 
informed decision.”  Id. at 1248.  
 60  Id. at 1240–42.  
 61  Id. at 1249 (“On reflection . . . it appears that the essential evil is . . . taking advantage 
of a woman’s circumstances . . . in order to take away her child.”). 
 62  Id. at 1256, 1260–61.  The Court remanded the case to the trial court for determination 
on visitation.  Id. at 1261.  On remand, the trial court found that it was in the child’s best 
interest to have an ongoing relationship with Whitehead and, therefore, granted her 
“unsupervised, uninterrupted, liberal visitation” with Baby M.  In re Baby M, 542 A.2d 52, 
53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988).  
 63  See Scott, supra note 37, at 121–22.  
 64  Intended Parents: Establishing Parentage in Surrogacy, SURROGATE.COM, 
https://www.surrogate.com/intended-parents/surrogacy-laws-and-legal-
information/establishing-parentage-in-surrogacy (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).   
 65  See Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER. 68, 79 (2007) (indicating that ninety-five percent of surrogacy 
arrangements are gestational).  
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Gestational surrogacy differs from traditional surrogacy in that the 
former is a “pregnancy in which one woman (the genetic mother) provides 
the egg, which is fertilized, and another woman (the surrogate mother) 
carries the fetus and gives birth to the child.”66  Because the surrogate does 
not provide the egg, she is not biologically related to the child.67  Therefore, 
it is less burdensome for courts to determine that the surrogate has no 
parental rights to the child.68  This, in effect, simplifies parentage issues and 
makes gestational surrogacy less legally complicated than traditional 
surrogacy.69  Gestational surrogacy proves to be more attractive to the parties 
and more palatable to lawmakers and the public.70  Over the last three 
decades,71 this type of surrogacy experienced an expanding growth in 
popularity, which can be attributed to cases such as Johnson v. Calvert.72 
Five years after the Baby M decision, the enforceability of a commercial 
surrogacy contract was again litigated in Johnson v. Calvert.73  By contrast, 
however, the dispute focused on gestational surrogacy.74  In 1990, Anna 
Johnson contracted with Mark and Crispina Calvert, agreeing to be 
implanted with an embryo created from Mr. Calvert’s sperm and Mrs. 
Calvert’s egg and to gestate the fetus to term.75  The contract stipulated the 
Calverts as the legal parents and required Johnson to relinquish all parental 
rights in exchange for three payments totaling $10,000.76  In the months 
succeeding Johnson’s in vitro fertilization, however, the relations between 
 
 66  Gestational Surrogacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 67  Gestational Carrier or Surrogacy, REPRODUCTIVEFACTS.ORG, 
https://www.reproductivefacts.org/topics/topics-index/gestational-carrier-or-surrogacy (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
 68  Brittnay M. McMahon, The Science Behind Surrogacy: Why New York Should Rethink 
Its Surrogacy Contracts Laws, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 359, 363 (2011).  
 69  See Scott, supra note 37. 
 70  See infra text accompanying notes 73–85.   
 71  About Surrogacy: From the Bible to Today: The History of Surrogacy, supra note 30. 
 72  851 P.2d 776 (1993); see also Gestational Surrogacy or Traditional Surrogacy? That 
is the Question, SURROGACY PARENTING SERVS. (Dec. 9, 2014), 
http://surrogateparenting.com/gestational-surrogacy-traditional-surrogacy-question; see also 
Scott, supra note 37, at 122.  
 73  In addition to Baby M, Johnson is considered another landmark surrogacy case that 
yields particular importance in the United States.  See J. HERBIE DIFONZO & RUTH C. STERN, 
INTIMATE ASSOCIATIONS: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF AMERICAN FAMILIES 96 (2013).  
Although the Johnson decision generated little controversy, “the case had a profound impact 
on surrogacy practice.”  Scott, supra note 37, at 122.  Gestational surrogacy promptly became 
the preferred arrangement.  Id.  
 74  Johnson, 851 P.2d at 777–78. 
 75  Id. at 778.  Mark and Crispina Calvert had desired to have children but were unable to 
because Mrs. Calvert had undergone a hysterectomy, where her uterus was removed.  Id.  “Her 
ovaries remained capable of producing eggs, however, and the couple eventually considered 
surrogacy.”  Id.  
 76  Id.  
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the parties soured.77  Johnson demanded the full balance of her payments, 
threatening to refuse to relinquish the child unless the Calverts complied.78  
The Calverts responded with a lawsuit to determine the parentage of the 
child.79 
The Supreme Court of California resolved the dilemma by looking at 
the intent of the parties in signing the contract.80  The court determined that 
when both gestation and genetic ties “do not coincide in one woman, she 
who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who intended to bring about 
the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own—is the natural 
mother.”81  The court found intent to be the primary determinant of 
parentage, reasoning that the child would not have been born but for the 
intention of the Calverts.82  The Supreme Court of California found the case 
to be distinguishable from the Baby M case because Anna Johnson, unlike 
Mary Beth Whitehead, had no genetic relationship to the child.83  The court 
emphasized the importance of the biological connection between the 
pregnant woman and the fetus in determining parentage.84  The court 
ultimately concluded that the Calverts were the genetic parents, that Johnson 
had no parental rights, and that the contract was legal and enforceable.85 
The difference between gestational and traditional surrogacy 
arrangements is an important legal distinction, central to determining the 
legal status of those involved.  In the case of traditional surrogacy, it is clear 
that the surrogate is the biological mother of the child and, as such, has a 
claim to parental rights to the child.86  In the case of gestational surrogacy, 
however, the surrogate is in no way biologically related to the child and 
 
 77  Id.  The relationship between the parties deteriorated after “Mark learned that Anna 
had not disclosed she had [previously] suffered several stillbirths and miscarriages.”  Id.  
Additionally, the Calverts had agreed to buy a $200,000 life insurance policy on Johnson’s 
life, but failed to do.  Id.   
 78  Id.   
 79  Id.  
 80  Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783.  
 81  Id. at 782.  
 82  Id. at 783.  A number of cases following Johnson have relied on the rule of intent to 
resolve surrogacy disputes.  Perri Koll, The Use of the Intent Doctrine to Expand the Right of 
Intended Homosexual Male Parents in Surrogacy Custody Disputes, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 199, 200 (2012).  For further discussion of the “intent doctrine,” see id. at 201 
(demonstrating “why courts should follow the Johnson v. Calvert approach in solving 
surrogacy disputes by awarding custody to the intended parents”).   
 83  See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782; see also id. at 789 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 84  See id. at 782. 
 85  Id. at 778, 787.  Courts in additional cases applied similar reasoning.  See J.F. v. D.B., 
879 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 2007); J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); Nolan v. 
Labree, 52 A.3d 923 (Me. 2012).  
 86  Scott, supra note 37. 
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therefore has no parental rights to said child.87  Hence, commercial surrogacy 
arrangements are typically limited to gestational surrogacy because it is less 
legally complicated—that is, it efficiently offers legal certainty about the 
parental status of all parties to the surrogacy arrangement—than traditional 
surrogacy.88 
B. Trends and Reproductive Outcomes That Have Led to the Growth 
of Surrogacy over the Years 
The cost of gestational surrogacy arrangements can run from $60,000 
to $150,000 when medical and legal expenses are included.89  Despite these 
high costs, however, the practice of gestational surrogacy is growing 
rapidly.90  Due to advancing medical knowledge and techniques, commercial 
surrogacy now serves the desires of couples struggling with infertility issues, 
as well as single individuals and same-sex couples looking to start a family 
of their own.91  Although there is no formal collection of statistics tracking 
surrogate births in the United States, estimates suggest that gestational 
surrogate births nearly doubled from 2004 to 2008, reaching approximately 
1,400 births annually.92  The CDC’s statistics indicate that between 1999 and 
2013, gestational carrier cycles resulted in 13,380 deliveries and the births 
of 18,400 infants—half of which were twins, triplets, or higher-order 
multiples.93  “In 2011, the Society of Assisted Reproductive Technology 
(SART) tracked 1,593 babies born in the United States to gestational 
surrogates . . . up from 1,353 in 2009, and just 738 in 2004.”94 
 
 87  McMahon, supra note 68, at 363. 
 88  For additional commentary on how the expansion of gestational surrogacy has been 
an important factor in changing the way people view surrogacy arrangements, see Scott, supra 
note 37. 
 89  See Intended Parents: How Much Does Surrogacy Cost?, SURROGATE.COM, 
https://surrogate.com/intended-parents/the-surrogacy-process/how-much-does-surrogacy-
cost/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018); see also Understanding Costs, GROWING GENERATIONS, 
https://www.growinggenerations.com/surrogacy-program/intended-parents/surrogacy-cost/ 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2018).  
 90  SOLINGER, supra note 34, at 108. 
 91  See FIELD, supra note 57, at 37; see also SHANLEY, supra note 40, at 106.  
 92  Gugucheva, supra note 10, at 4, 11–12.  Currently, there are only two sources of 
statistics on gestational surrogacy.  Id. at 6.  Both the CDC and SART collect and report data 
on the success rates per ART cycle carried out in fertility clinics nationally.  See 2015 Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Fertility Clinic Success Rates Report, supra note 1.  Each clinic is 
required to report whether it offers services to patients using gestational surrogates and what 
percentage of IVF cycles were performed on surrogates.  Id.  Small and new clinics are exempt 
from CDC reporting, and not all IVF clinics are members of SART.  Id.  Therefore, it is likely 
that both data sets are under-inclusive.  
 93  ART and Gestational Carriers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/art/key-findings/gestational-carriers.html (last visited April 10, 2018).  
 94  Deborah L. Cohen, Surrogate Pregnancies on Rise Despite Cost Hurdles, THOMSON 
REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2013, 5:41 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-parent-
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The appeal to couples struggling with infertility issues has been an 
important factor in the growing prevalence of gestational surrogacy.95  
Commercial surrogacy arrangements allow infertile individuals who cannot 
bear children to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.96  According to 
the CDC, about 12.1% of women (6.7 million) in the United States aged 
fifteen to forty-five have difficulty getting pregnant or staying pregnant and 
about 9.4% (5.8 million) of men in the United States aged fifteen to forty-
five have some form of infertility or nonsurgical sterility.97  Many infertile 
couples view gestational surrogacy as an appealing alternative to adoption.98  
Individuals struggling with infertility issues prefer to use gestational 
surrogacy rather than adoption because of their desire to create children 
genetically related to their family.99 
Another factor attributing to the growing prevalence of gestational 
surrogacy is an individual’s inability to conceive based on circumstantial 
limitations—for example, single individuals preferring to raise a child alone, 
or same-sex couples seeking parenthood.100  Persons in these situations are 
unable to give birth to a child without the assistance of reproductive 
technology.101  Therefore, with the emergence of gestational surrogacy, 
single individuals and same-sex couples can pursue parenthood in ways that, 
until now, were not possible.102  As a viable option for conception without 
engaging in intercourse, gestational surrogacy provides single individuals 
and couples in same-sex relationships the opportunity to develop their own 
nuclear family, while still retaining a genetic relationship with their 
children.103 
 
surrogate/surrogate-pregnancies-on-rise-despite-cost-hurdles-idUSB 
RE92H11Q20130318.  
 95  See SHANLEY, supra note 40, at 106. 
 96  Id.  
 97 Anjani Chandra et al., Infertility and Impaired Fecundity in the United States, 1982–
2010: Data from the National Survey of Family Growth, 67 NAT’L HEALTH STATS. REPS. 1, 6 
(2013). 
 98  See DIFONZO & STERN, supra note 73, at 68.  Adoption is a lengthy process that can 
take one to two years to complete.  See id. (“[T]he adoption process could be costly, risky, 
and subject to disruption.”).  Often, couples struggling with infertility issues choose surrogacy 
after years of failed fertility treatments or difficulty finding a child to adopt.  See ZARA 
GRISWOLD, SURROGACY WAS THE WAY: TWENTY INTENDED MOTHERS TELL THEIR STORIES 
138 (2006). 
 99  See Koll, supra note 82, at 202.  
 100  See DIFONZO & STERN, supra note 73, at 72; see also SEMBER, supra note 10, at 160–
61.  
 101  See SEMBER, supra note 10, at 160–61. 
 102  DEAN A. MURPHY, GAY MEN PURSUING PARENTHOOD THROUGH SURROGACY: 
RECONFIGURING KINSHIP 22 (2015). 
 103  See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS 
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 69–96 (2006) (discussing the historical evolution of 
surrogacy); see also Erica Davis, Note, The Rise of Gestational Surrogacy and the Pressing 
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Same-sex male couples, in contrast to same-sex female couples, 
however, have no other option than gestational surrogacy if they wish to have 
a biological connection to their child.104  Although there is no formal tracking 
on the number of same-sex male couples having babies through the means 
of gestational surrogacy, observers say that the numbers are growing.105  An 
unofficial study conducted by Fertility IQ on behalf of the Chicago Tribune 
suggests that more same-sex male couples in the United States are turning to 
surrogacy than in previous years.106  The study, involving data from fertility 
clinics in ten different cities, found that “10 to 20 percent of donor eggs are 
going to gay men having babies via [gestational] surrogacy, and in a lot of 
places the numbers are up to 50 percent from five years ago.”107  Gestational 
surrogacy is seen as an appealing option for same-sex male couples seeking 
to have children with some of their own genetic material rather than 
adopting.108 
The decision to enter into a commercial surrogacy arrangement is not 
an easy decision for prospective parents; however, couples struggling with 
infertility issues, single individuals, and same-sex couples are willing to go 
through various medical procedures, sign a variety of legal documents, and 
pay significant sums of money simply to experience the joy of having 
 
Need for International Regulation, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 120, 122 (2012). 
 104  See Koll, supra note 82, at 202; see also Wendy Norton, Nicky Hudson & Lorraine 
Culley, Gay Men Seeking Surrogacy to Achieve Parenthood, 27 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE 
ONLINE 271, 272–73 (2013), https://ac.els-cdn.com/S1472648313001806/1-s2.0-
S1472648313001806-main.pdf?_tid=c180b25c-a126-4623-8a65-
ae0b3daee604&acdnat=1538670459_e4985e106e0819d12a32477cce1af1d3 (“Gay men 
wishing to become fathers are limited by biological possibilities and therefore always require 
a ‘facilitating other.’”).  The number one reason same-sex male couples chose surrogacy is to 
have a biological connection to their children.  Arlene Istar Lev, Commentary, Gay Dads: 
Choosing Surrogacy, 7 LESBIAN & GAY PSYCHOL. REV. 72, 74 (2006) (“Scott, who is 
partnered with Eduardo and the father of 18-month-old twins . . . says, ‘We wanted the 
biological connection with a child.’”).  
 105  See, e.g., DAVID STRAH, GAY DADS: A CELEBRATION OF FATHERHOOD 56–57 (2003); 
Nara Schoenberg, Gay Men Increasingly Turn to Surrogates to Have Babies, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 
23, 2016, 8:59 AM), www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/health/sc-gay-men-having-babies-
health-1130-20161123-story.html.  
 106  Schoenberg, supra note 105. 
 107  Id. 
 108  See Koll, supra note 82, at 202.  With the growing prevalence of commercial 
surrogacy, it should be noted that same-sex couples may look outside of the United States for 
arrangements but should be cognizant of the potential limitations.  For example, in India and 
Russia, same-sex marriages are strictly prohibited—in fact, they are punishable by 
incarceration.  Evie Jeang, Reviewing the Legal Issues that Affect Surrogacy for Same-Sex 
Couples, L.A. LAW., Jul.–Aug. 2016, at 12.  The increased practice of same-sex male 
surrogacy in India ultimately led to a same-sex surrogacy ban, which contributed to the 
country imposing a national commercial surrogacy ban.  See Izabela Jargilo, Regulating the 
Trade of Commercial Surrogacy in India, 15 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 337, 345 (2016).  Therefore, 
same-sex couples may not have an option to enter commercial surrogacy arrangements 
everywhere internationally.  
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biologically-related children.109  As the availability of commercial surrogacy 
arrangements continues to grow, individuals are becoming increasingly more 
aware of its potential as a viable option to obtain parenthood.110 
C. Feminist Legal Theory: Surrogacy Through the Lenses of Various 
Schools of Feminism 
It was through the Baby M case that commercial surrogacy was first 
scrutinized as an issue of social, political, and legal interest.111  Not only did 
the case garner national attention, but it also produced a feminist split on the 
issue of surrogacy.112  At the time of the proceedings, a group of well-known 
feminists joined with the Foundation on Economic Trends to file an amicus 
curiae brief in the case.113  The brief argued that the commercialization of 
surrogate parenthood violated the dignity of women.114  In response to this 
critique, however, other feminists argued that commercial surrogacy ensured 
women’s right to self-determination.115  Even the New Jersey Chapter of the 
National Organization for Women (NOW)116 failed to reach a consensus on 
 
 109  See supra text accompanying notes 89–99. 
 110  An increasing number of high-profile celebrities have also helped contribute to the 
popularity of couples choosing to use commercial surrogacy to start a family.  See Lindsay 
Tigar, 19 Celebrities Who Used Surrogates, MEREDITH CORP., 
https://www.parents.com/parenting/celebrity-parents/moms-dads/celebrities-who-used-
surrogates/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018); see also Melody Chiu & Jen Juneau, Kim Kardashian 
and Kanye West Expecting Baby No. 3 via Surrogate!, PEOPLE (Sept. 6, 2017, 11:29 AM), 
https://people.com/parents/kanye-west-kim-kardashian-expecting-third-child-surrogate-
pregnant/.  With the help of celebrities showing a positive side to surrogacy, many people 
have been inspired to start families of their own using this method of reproduction.  The 
Celebrity Influence on Surrogacy, CONCEIVEABILITIES (Nov. 16, 2016), 
https://www.conceiveabilities.com/about/blog/the-celebrity-influence-on-surrogacy.  
Celebrities have been influential in surrogacy becoming widely accepted, generating a larger 
discussion about the “modern family.”  Id.  
 111  See supra Part II.A.  
 112  RUTH MACKLIN, SURROGATES AND OTHER MOTHERS: THE DEBATES OVER ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTION 60 (1994).  
 113  MARY BRIODY MAHOWALD, WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN HEALTH CARE: AN UNEQUAL 
MAJORITY 108 n.56 (1993) (citing Brief for the Foundation of Economic Trends et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396 (1988) (No.  FM-25314-
86E)).  The feminists joining the brief included Betty Friedan, Gloria Steinem, Gena Corea, 
Barbara Katz Rothman, Lois Gould, Michelle Harrison, Kathleen Lahey, Phyllis Chesler, and 
Letty Cottin Pogrebin.  Id.; see Elizabeth Mehren, Feminists Fight Court Ruling in Baby M 
Decision: Steinem, Friedan, Chesler, French Among Supporters, L.A. TIMES (July 31, 1987), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1987-07-31/news/vw-147_1_gloria-steinem; see also Joseph F. 
Sullivan, Brief by Feminists Opposes Surrogate Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1987, at 
B3.   
 114  Sullivan, supra note 113.  
 115  See Iver Peterson, Baby M Trial Splits Ranks of Feminists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1987, 
at B1.  
 116  NOW is the largest organization of feminist activities in the United States. Who We 
Are, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, https://now.org/about/who-we-are/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).  
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the issue.117  The head of the chapter was reported to have said: “We do 
believe that women ought to control their own bodies, and we don’t want to 
play big brother or big sister and tell them what to do . . . .  But on the other 
hand, we don’t want to see the day when women are turned into breeding 
machines.”118 
After the Baby M case, the division among the various feminist schools 
of thought on commercial surrogacy continued to be a topic of contention.119  
Today, while some feminist scholars and commentators view commercial 
surrogacy in a positive light—as a technology that gives women the ability 
to make use of their reproductive capacity—other feminists argue that 
surrogacy is an exploitative tool that undermines bodily autonomy and 
integrity.120  One commonality among the varying feminist viewpoints on 
this issue, however, is that the intended parents should not have an unfettered 
right to control or limit the surrogate’s behavior during the pregnancy by 
provisions in a surrogacy contract.121  The majority of feminists are in 
agreement that the underlying purpose of the feminist movement is to allow 
women more control over their reproductive choices.122  It is important to 
explore the arguments in favor of commercial surrogacy as well as the 
arguments against commercial surrogacy in order to find an appropriate 
solution. 
On one hand, feminist proponents of commercial surrogacy argue that 
it gives women more reproductive options, thus granting women control over 
the biological processes that have historically defined them.123  In their view, 
the key idea is freedom of choice.124  For example, Hugh V. McLachlan 
 
Since its founding in 1966, NOW’s goal has been to take action to bring about equality for all 
women.  Id.  
 117  MACKLIN, supra note 112. 
 118  Id.  
 119  ALEX FINKELSTEIN ET AL., COLUMBIA LAW SCH. SEXUALITY & GENDER LAW CLINIC, 
SURROGACY LAW AND POLICY IN THE U.S.: A NATIONAL CONVERSATION INFORMED BY 
GLOBAL LAWMAKING 32–37, 52 (2016).  
 120  Id.  Feminist scholars in favor of surrogacy argue that the right to enter into 
commercial surrogacy arrangements is a natural extension of the right to personal autonomy.  
Liezl van Zyl & Anton van Niekerk, Interpretations, Perspectives and Intentions in Surrogate 
Motherhood, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 404, 404 (2000).  Other feminists, in contrast, view 
commercial surrogacy as a contractually regulated pregnancy that restricts the surrogate to 
terms and conditions binding over her body, constraining her bodily autonomy and bodily 
integrity.  See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 246–
48 (1989).  
 121  MACKLIN, supra note 112.  
 122  See Norma Juliet Wikler, Society’s Response to the New Reproductive Technologies: 
The Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1043, 1051 (1986); see infra Part III.A for an 
extensive analysis on well-established reproductive rights.  
 123  RONIT IRSHAI, FERTILITY AND JEWISH LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ORTHODOX 
RESPONSA LITERATURE 151–52 (Joel A. Linsider trans., 2012).   
 124  Id.  
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argues that prohibiting “mothers from making . . . particulate interpretations 
of their pregnanc[ies]” would violate their right to autonomy, ultimately 
reinforcing the negative stereotype of women as incapable of full, rational 
agency.125  And on the other hand, feminists that oppose commercial 
surrogacy view it as a form of slavery or prostitution in which the surrogate 
is exploited and controlled through her reproductive capacities.126  Many 
believe that it is a form of oppression that divests the surrogate of all 
autonomous, decision-making rights.127  Feminists arguing against 
commercial surrogacy focus on the concept of control and free choice.128  
From this perspective, commercial surrogacy is “a process meant to control 
women and their procreative powers for the benefit of men.”129  Therefore, 
in formulating the appropriate solution, one should keep in mind that the 
middle ground between these two viewpoints is the encouragement of the 
surrogate’s freedom of choice—which is to say, the majority of feminists 
agree that the intended parents should not have an unfettered right to control 
or limit a surrogate’s behavior. 
III. THE COMPOSITION OF A STANDARD SURROGACY CONTRACT 
Commercial surrogacy arrangements are anomalous in that they 
involve one or more persons contracting for the provision of labor that 
implicates the bodily integrity of a third party.130  Contractual provisions in 
the commercial surrogacy agreement regulate the surrogate’s conduct during 
pregnancy.131  Each contract will be slightly different, but generally 
speaking, a standard surrogacy agreement imposes obligations on the 
surrogate “to visit the doctor, to eat healthy, and to refrain from consuming 
substances such as drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes that could harm the 
developing fetus.”132  Because the potential life engenders some degree of 
 
 125  Hugh V. McLachlan, Defending Commercial Surrogate Motherhood Against Van 
Niekerk and Van Zyl, 23 J. MED. ETHICS 344, 346 (1997).  McLachlan is a professor of applied 
philosophy at the School of Law and Social Sciences at Glasgow Caledonian University.  Id. 
at 348.  
 126  See MACKINNON, supra note 120.  For an expansive comparison of commercial 
surrogacy and prostitution, see ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 181–82 (1983).  
Andrea Dworkin offers the most radical and scathing formulation of the critique by offering 
two models to describe how women are socially controlled and sexually exploited: the brothel 
and the farm.  Id.  The brothel model relates to prostitution, and the farm model relates to 
women as a class planted with the male seed and then harvested.  Id.  
 127  Lieber, supra note 32, at 205–06.  
 128  Id. 
 129  IRSHAI, supra note 123, at 207.   
 130  Lieber, supra note 32, at 212–13, 226–27. 
 131  Id.  For a sample gestational surrogacy contract, see Sample Gestational Surrogacy 
Contract, SURROGATE MOTHERS ONLINE, 
www.surromomsonline.com/articles/gscontract.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
 132  FIELD, supra note 57, at 66; see infra Part III.B.  
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social concern, these provisions appear to have reasonable restrictions; 
however, issues arise when these provisions divest the surrogate of all 
autonomous, decision-making rights.133  For example, most commercial 
surrogacy contracts regulate when, and with whom, the surrogate can engage 
in sexual activity, and also contain abortion and selective fetal reduction 
clauses.134  Thus, it is important that the autonomous rights of the surrogate 
are “reaffirmed so as to prevent intended parents from believing that by 
virtue of carrying a fetus for them, a surrogate is surrendering her 
constitutional rights to make decisions about her own body.”135  Before 
discussing the appropriate limitations, however, it is necessary to first 
closely examine the public policy and constitutional concerns raised by these 
intrusive decision-making provisions in commercial surrogacy contracts. 
A. Abortion and Selection Fetal Reduction Clauses 
In general, commercial surrogacy contracts contain stipulations that 
either compel or restrict a surrogate to have an abortion.136  The provision 
typically reads as follows: 
The Surrogate agrees that she will not abort the child once 
conceived except, if in the opinion of the inseminating physician, 
such action is necessary for the physical health of the Surrogate or 
the child has been determined by said physician to be 
physiologically abnormal. In the event of either of these two (2) 
contingencies, the Surrogate desires and agrees to have said 
abortion.137 
Controversial cases surrounding the enforcement of these abortion clauses 
in commercial surrogacy agreements have garnered widespread attention in 
recent years.  In 2012, Crystal Kelley, a gestational surrogate for an infertile 
couple, refused to terminate a fetus with severe abnormalities.138  Twenty-
one weeks into the pregnancy, medical tests indicated that the fetus had a 
 
 133  See Ohs, supra note 33. 
 134  Jennifer Lahl, Contract Pregnancies Exposed: Surrogacy Contracts Don’t Protect 
Surrogate Mothers and Their Children, THE WITHERSPOON INST. (Nov. 1, 2017), 
www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2017/11/20390; see infra Part III.A.   
 135  Ohs, supra note 33, at 351.  
 136  Carmina Y. D’Aversa, The Right of Abortion in Surrogate Motherhood Arrangements, 
7 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987).  
 137  Id. (quoting Katie Marie Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. 
FAM. L. 263, 280 (1981)). 
 138  Elizabeth Cohen, Surrogate Offered $10,000 to Abort Baby, CNN (Mar. 6, 2013, 2:58 
PM), https://www.cnn.com 
/2013/03/04/health/surrogacy-kelley-legal-battle/index.html; Kevin Dolak, Surrogate Mother 
Flees Halfway Across US to Save Baby From Intended Parents, ABC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2013), 
abcnews.go.com/UD/surrogate-mother-flees-halfway-us=save-baby-
intended/story?id=18668498. 
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cleft palate, a heart abnormality, and Down Syndrome.139  The intended 
parents demanded that the child be aborted immediately.140  Although the 
surrogacy contract contained a clause giving the intended parents the right 
to terminate the fetus at any time if it had severe and debilitative 
abnormalities, Kelley refused to have an abortion.141 
Another case arose in 2016 after a surrogate, Melissa Cook, refused to 
selectively reduce a high-risk triplet pregnancy.142  Because of Cook’s 
advanced age, multiple embryos were transferred to increase the chances that 
at least one would prove viable.143  Fearing he would not be able to afford 
triplets, the intended father asked Cook to reduce the pregnancy by one fetus 
and abide by their agreement’s selective reduction clause.144  Cook, however, 
refused to do so, “citing her anti-abortion beliefs.”145 
In 2001, Helen Beasley entered into a surrogacy agreement with 
Charles Wheeler and Martha Berman.146  The contract contained numerous 
clauses providing for nearly every possible contingency—including the 
requirement that Beasley would have to honor the couple’s decision to have 
a selective reduction in the chance of a multiple pregnancy.147  After Beasley 
discovered that she was carrying twins, however, she refused to proceed with 
the selective reduction.148  A battled ensued, with Wheeler and Berman 
unwilling to parent the two fetuses Beasley carried.149  Because Beasley 
failed to comply with the contract, she faced the possibility of becoming a 
mother.150  These cases reveal important constitutional concerns surrounding 
 
 139  Cohen, supra note 138.  
 140  Id. 
 141  Id.  The child was born with severe health issues and was later given up for adoption 
to another family.  Id. 
 142  Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 928–29 (C.D. Cal. 2016); see also Michelle 
Goldberg, Is a Surrogate a Mother?, SLATE (Feb. 15, 2016, 5:00 PM), 
www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2016/02/custody_case_over_ 
triplets_in_california_raises_questions_about_surrogacy.html. 
 143  Cook, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 928.  
 144  Id. at 928–29.  
 145  Id.  The three babies were ultimately born prematurely and remained in the neonatal 
intensive care unit for two months.  Id. at 929.  Thereafter, a hotly contested legal battle over 
parentage and the constitutionality of the California Parentage Act ensued between Cook and 
C.M.  See supra Part I.  
 146  Beasley v. Wheeler, No. CGC-01-401717 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 4, 2002); Chris Taylor, 
One Baby Too Many, TIME (Aug. 19, 2011), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,171789,00.html; Nightline: World 
News Now (ABC television broadcast Aug. 29, 2001), available at LEXIS, News Library, 
ABCNEW File. 
 147  Taylor, supra note 146. 
 148  Id. 
 149  Id. 
 150  The resolution of the conflict is unknown because the court proceedings were sealed.  
Helen Beasley v. Charles Wheeler Et Al, PLAINSITE, 
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commercial surrogacy arrangements.151  In each situation, the intended 
parents attempted to abrogate the surrogate’s constitutional rights with the 
use of contractual provisions.152 
This area of contention surrounding the decision to reduce the 
pregnancy of a surrogate necessarily implicates Roe v. Wade.153  In Roe, the 
Supreme Court held that, prior to fetal viability, a woman has the 
constitutional right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.154  
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated that the “right of privacy, 
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal 
liberty . . . or . . . the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, 
is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.”155  The Court noted, however, that the State has a 
compelling interest in potential life, which must be balanced against the 
pregnant woman’s liberty rights.156 
The ruling in Roe appears to be applicable to the surrogacy situation as 
well.  Privacy is protected in all abortion cases, up until the first trimester, 
notwithstanding whether or not the woman is a surrogate.  The surrogate, in 
carrying the child, is the person who undergoes several aspects of pregnancy 
recognized in Roe that support a woman’s constitutional right to abortion.157  
This is not without acknowledging the fact that the State has a compelling 
interest in protecting the desires of the intended parents, which must be 
balanced against the surrogate’s privacy rights.158  Roe’s constitutional 
principles provide a surrogate with the basis upon which she can claim sole 
right to decide whether or not to abort the developing fetus that she is 
 
https://www.plainsite.org/dockets/wd8kdctj/superior-court-of-california-county-of-san-
francisco/helen-beasley-v-charles-wheeler-et-al/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2018); see ROSEMARIE 
SKAINE, PATERNITY AND AMERICAN LAW 112–13 (2003).  
 151  It should be noted that while these cases received press attention, there are likely others 
across the country that have gone unnoticed, yet dealt with similar situations.   
 152  See supra text accompanying notes 138–149.   
 153  410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 154  Id. at 153–55, 164–66.   
 155  Id. at 153.  
 156  Id. at 150, 156, 162–63.   
 157  See id. at 153–55.  The Court recognized that “specific and direct harm medically 
diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved” and that “mental and physical health 
may be taxed by child care.” Id. at 153 (referring to the distress associated with the unwanted 
child).  Some of these aspects of pregnancy are applicable to the interests of the surrogate, 
while others are confined to “regular” pregnancy, which was the focus of Roe.  With that 
being said, however, the Court addressed numerous rights pertaining to motherhood that 
transcend the plights of “regular” pregnancy and, ultimately, encompass surrogacy as well. 
 158  See Krista Sirola, Are You My Mother? Defending the Rights of Intended Parents in 
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements in Pennsylvania, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
131, 145–46 (2006).  
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carrying for another.159 
In the context of abortion rights, commercial surrogacy agreements are 
analogous to spousal consent requirements.  In Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Danforth,160 the Supreme Court struck down a Missouri 
requirement of a husband’s written consent for an abortion during the first 
twelve weeks of pregnancy.161  The Court held that a “State does not have 
the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute . . . veto over” 
the abortion decision.162  In assessing the constitutional validity of the 
consent-clause, the Court balanced the “interest that a devoted and protective 
husband has in his wife’s pregnancy and in the growth and development of 
the fetus she is carrying” and the woman’s right to terminate her 
pregnancy.163  The Court concluded that since the woman “is [] more directly 
and immediately affected by the pregnancy . . . the balance weighs in her 
favor.”164  As such, if it is unconstitutional to require a husband’s consent 
before a wife terminates her pregnancy, then, analogously, the constitution 
forbids the intended parents’ lack of consent as prohibitive.  A woman’s right 
to decide whether to continue pregnancy or to have an abortion falls within 
the scope of bodily autonomy and privacy protections that Roe v. Wade made 
clear forty-five years ago.165 
The selective fetal reduction clauses within the surrogacy contracts 
cited in the cases above clearly exemplify the unconstitutional nature of 
commercial surrogacy arrangements when an intended parent attempts to 
make intrusive decisions for the surrogate mother.  Thus, the constitutional 
implications of these provisions should favor the surrogate, and, in addition, 
courts should not enforce a contractual provision requiring a surrogate to 
abort a fetus against her will or prevent her from obtaining an abortion that 
she has decided is in her best interest. 
B. Other Areas of Intrusive Decision-Making 
In addition to termination and selective fetal reduction clauses, 
commercial surrogacy agreements attempt to control and restrict other areas 
pertaining to the surrogate’s decision-making abilities.166  For example, 
surrogacy contracts can contain clauses that regulate the surrogate’s diet, 
exercise, living arrangements, when and with whom the surrogate can 
 
 159  See id. 
 160  428 U.S. 52 (1976).  
 161  Id. at 67–68, 83–84. 
 162  Id. at 74.  
 163  Id. at 70–71.  
 164  Id. at 71. 
 165  See id. at 60–61.  
 166  See FIELD, supra note 57, at 66.  
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engage in sexual activity, and even end-of-life decision making.167  Terms of 
the agreement providing that the surrogate must not smoke or drink alcoholic 
beverages or that the surrogate mother abstain from sex for a short period 
after insemination are reasonable restrictions.168 Terms of the agreement, 
however, stipulating that the surrogate mother must consume a vegan diet 
and eat only organic foods or that the intended parents will control all 
medical treatment decisions are not reasonable restrictions, thus violating 
constitutional principles derived from Roe.169  Therefore, it is necessary to 
find the extent to which these provisions can impinge the bodily integrity of 
the surrogate. 
There is, in fact, broad agreement “that while fetal life deserves respect, 
its protection cannot take priority over the rights of the pregnant woman.”170  
The protection of a surrogate’s bodily autonomy should include her right to 
make medical decisions, which not only encompasses abortion, but also the 
“freedom to care for one’s health and person” and the “freedom from bodily 
restraint or compulsion.”171  The right to control one’s medical treatment is 
highly personal.172  For example, in In re Baby Boy Doe, a pregnant woman 
was informed that if she failed to have an immediate cesarean section, her 
child could be born dead or with severe mental defects.173  Because of 
religious beliefs, the woman refused to consent to the procedure and instead 
elected to deliver naturally.174  The court confirmed her right to make such a 
decision, stating, “[a]pplied in the context of compelled medical treatment 
of pregnant women . . . a woman’s right to refuse invasive medical 
treatment, derived from her rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and religious 
liberty, is not diminished during pregnancy.”175  This ruling, again, appears 
to be applicable to the surrogacy situation.  There is no reason to distinguish 
between mothers who give birth naturally and surrogates who carry 
 
 167  Lahl, supra note 134. 
 168  See id. (“Contracts also regulate when the surrogate can engage in sexual activity and 
with whom.”).  
 169  See id. (“Most contracts explicitly control the surrogate’s diet, exercise, living 
arrangements, travel, and activities.”).  
 170  Emily Jackson, Abortion, Autonomy and Prenatal Diagnosis, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 
467, 467 (2000) (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT 
ABORTION AND EUTHANASIA (1993)).  
 171  D’Aversa, supra note 136, at 10 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) 
(Douglas, J., concurring)); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (“[T]he abortion 
decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision.”). 
 172  See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (1994).   
 173  Id. at 327.  
 174  Id. 
 175  Id. at 332; see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding 
that competent, dying persons have the right to direct the removal of life-sustaining medical 
treatment).  
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developing infants unrelated to them—both implicate personal rights related 
to autonomous decision-making. 
Contractual provisions dictating the surrogate’s conduct throughout the 
pregnancy create a tension between allowing the intended parents to make 
decisions for the surrogate mother in the hopes of protecting their developing 
fetus and ensuring that the surrogacy contract does not divest the surrogate 
of all autonomous decision-making rights.  By using the Roe framework, as 
well as the In re Baby Boy Doe decision, there are well-established 
constitutional rights that protect the surrogate mother from unfettered bodily 
intrusion.176  It should of course be acknowledged that this robust 
commitment to respecting a surrogate’s right to make her own decisions 
extends only to constitutional rights and what she has not waived in the 
surrogacy contract.  Therefore, courts should not enforce contracts that 
compel waiver of constitutional rights and states should legislatively impose 
restrictions on which aspects of decision-making can or cannot be waived. 
IV. THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME AMONG THE STATES 
Despite the growing prevalence and availability of commercial 
surrogacy arrangements,177 the law of surrogate motherhood in the United 
States is still in a state of confusion.178  Surrogacy laws are determined by 
each state, and states have widely differing laws; some enforcing surrogacy 
contracts, some banning them entirely, and some allowing them under 
certain circumstances.179  Many states, however, do not have any laws 
regarding surrogacy contracts.180  As a result, courts are often left to decide 
contractual disputes when they arise, and have a range of approaches by 
which to do so.181 
An important starting position that states need to consider in 
determining their surrogacy laws is to focus on the surrogate.  This section 
will examine how different states with surrogacy laws handle contracts that 
include intrusive decision-making provisions that affect the bodily integrity 
 
 176  See supra text accompanying notes 153–165, 173–175. 
 177  See supra Part II.B.  
 178  See Gestational Surrogacy Law Across the United States: State-By-State Interactive 
Map for Commercial Surrogacy, CREATIVE FAMILY CONNECTIONS, 
https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-map/ (last visited Sept. 2, 
2018). 
 179  Id. 
 180  Id.  There are 15 states that permit surrogacy (e.g, California and Connecticut); 5 states 
that prohibit surrogacy (e.g., New York and Arizona); 11 states that allow some form of 
surrogacy (e.g., New Jersey and Pennsylvania); and 19 states that have neither enacted statutes 
nor published a case on surrogacy (e.g., Vermont and Georgia).  Id.   
 181  See, e.g., Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011); In re Paternity & Maternity 
of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); St. Mary v. Damon, 309 P.3d 1027 (Nev. 
2013).  
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of the surrogate.  It is imperative to assess the various ways in which states 
address this matter of contention in order to find an appropriate solution to 
ensure that the surrogacy contract does not divest the surrogate of all 
autonomous, decision-making rights. 
A.   State Statutes Limiting Intrusive Decision-Making Provisions in 
Surrogacy Arrangements 
Some states have already adopted statutes that restrict the extent to 
which a surrogacy contract can define the decision-making rights of a 
surrogate.  Maine,182 Texas,183 and Utah184 have enacted provisions that 
protect the surrogate’s autonomous rights in a broad sense.  They all state in 
a similar manner that the surrogacy agreement cannot limit the right of the 
gestational surrogate to make decisions to safeguard her health.185  The 
legislatures from these states, however, failed to define what decisions fall 
within the “to safeguard her health” scope.186  As a result, an argument can 
be made that the scope would include the right to choose whether or not to 
have an abortion or a cesarean section—but the bounds are unknown.  This 
ambiguity will eventually lead to disputes attempting to discern which 
provisions constitute a decision to safeguard a surrogate’s health. 
On the other end of the spectrum are states, such as Indiana,187 
Louisiana,188 and Florida,189 which have enacted provisions that protect the 
surrogate’s autonomous, decision-making rights in a narrow sense.  For 
example, Indiana finds it against public policy to require a surrogate to do 
any of the following: “consent to undergo or undergo an abortion,” “use a 
substance or engage in activity only in accordance with the demands of 
another person,” or “waive parental rights or duties to a child.”190  Louisiana 
and Florida have similar provisions that prohibit a surrogacy agreement from 
containing termination or selective fetal reduction clauses.191  These states 
 
 182  ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1932 (2016). 
 183  TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.754 (West 2003). 
 184  UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-808 (West 2005). 
 185  § 1932(5) (“A gestational carrier agreement may not limit the right of the gestational 
carrier to make decision[s] to safeguard her health.”); § 160.754(g) (“A gestational agreement 
may not limit the right of the gestational mother to make decisions to safeguard her health or 
the health of an embryo.”); § 78B-15-808(2) (“A gestational agreement may not limit the right 
of the gestational mother to make decisions to safeguard her health or that of the embryo or 
fetus.”). 
 186  See supra notes 182–185 and accompanying text.  
 187  IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West 1997). 
 188  LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:286(D) (2016). 
 189  FLA STAT. § 63.213 (2012). 
 190  § 31-20-1-1.  
 191  § 14:286(D)(4) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to . . . induce any gestational 
carrier, whether or not she is party to an enforceable or unenforceable agreement for genetic 
WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2018  12:45 PM 
2018] COMMENT 227 
leave a significant degree of latitude for the intended parents to control other 
areas of intrusive decision-making for the surrogate mother. 
In addition to imposing restrictions on specific rights that cannot be 
contracted away, state legislatures should provide courts with a general 
framework to determine whether to enforce contractual provisions that 
impose obligations on the surrogate.  But before discussing the appropriate 
framework, it is important to see which autonomous rights states allow 
surrogacy agreements to control. 
B. State Statutes Allowing Intrusive Decision-Making Provisions in 
Surrogacy Arrangements 
Some states have adopted statutes that specifically define which 
provisions can be contained in a surrogacy contract without hindering its 
enforceability.  Nevada,192 Delaware,193 and Illinois194 have enacted 
legislation that allows a surrogacy agreement to waive certain decision-
making rights of the surrogate.  For example, Nevada’s surrogacy laws 
provide that a surrogacy agreement will be upheld even if it contains the 
following terms: 
(a) The gestational carrier’s agreement to undergo all medical 
examinations, treatments and fetal monitoring procedures 
recommended for the success of the pregnancy by the physician 
providing care to the gestational carrier during the pregnancy. 
(b) The gestational carrier’s agreement to abstain from any 
activities that the intended parent or parents or the physician 
providing care to the gestational carrier during the pregnancy 
reasonably believes to be harmful to the pregnancy and the future 
health of any resulting child, including, without limitation, 
smoking, drinking alcohol, using nonprescribed drugs, using 
prescription drugs not authorized by a physician aware of the 
pregnancy, exposure to radiation or any other activity proscribed 
by a health care provider.195 
Although these provisions would limit the autonomous rights of the 
surrogate, they appear to be reasonable restrictions.196  The potential life 
engenders some degree of social concern, and as such, some of the 
surrogate’s decision-making rights will need to be subdued by the 
 
gestational carrier or gestational carrier contract, to consent to an abortion.”); § 63.213(3)(b) 
(“A preplanned adoption agreement shall not contain any provision . . . [r]equiring the 
termination of the volunteer mother’s pregnancy.”). 
 192  NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.750 (2013). 
 193  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-807 (2013).  
 194  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25 (2005). 
 195  § 126.750(5)(a)–(b).  
 196  See discussion supra Part III.  
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commercial surrogacy agreement between her and the intended parents.  
Therefore, it is necessary to find the extent to which these provisions can 
impinge the bodily integrity of the surrogate, striking a balance between 
allowing the intended parents to make intrusive decisions for the surrogate 
mother, and ensuring the surrogacy contract does not divest the surrogate of 
all autonomous decision-making rights. 
V. EVALUATING POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ADDRESS GAPS AND 
VARIATIONS 
One of the main concerns pertaining to commercial surrogacy focuses 
on the belief that the intended parents should not be able to use provisions in 
a surrogacy contract to have an unfettered ability to control or limit the 
surrogate’s behavior during the pregnancy.197  Commercial surrogacy 
arrangements are anomalous in that they involve one or more persons 
contracting for the provision of labor that implicates the bodily integrity of a 
third party.198  As a result, the surrogate mother is unable “to exercise a 
substantial amount of control over [her] performance of the contract.”199 
Although there is a well-recognized legal doctrine that allows parties to 
contract freely, and as such, waive some of their constitutional rights, the 
nature of commercial surrogacy is more permanent and personal than a 
typical contract.200  Therefore, legislation should impose restrictions on 
which aspects of decision-making can or cannot be waived.  As noted, in 
states such as Maine, Texas, and Utah, which have adopted broad limitations, 
these restrictions need to provide courts with a particularized framework to 
determine whether to enforce contractual provisions that impose obligations 
on the surrogate.201  In addition, as exemplified in states such as Indiana, 
Louisiana, and Florida, this framework needs to take into account some 
degree of social concern for the developing infant.202 
The proposed solution for this matter of contention is to provide a 
balancing test where courts should weigh various factors in order to 
determine the enforceability of contractual provisions that divest the 
surrogate of her autonomous, decision-making rights.  The first factor that 
courts should take into consideration is the constitutional right of privacy 
and liberty expressed in cases such as Roe v. Wade.203  Due to the permanent 
 
 197  See supra Part II.C.  
 198  See Lieber, supra note 32, at 226–27. 
 199  Keith J. Cunningham, Surrogate Mother Contracts: Analysis of a Remedial Quagmire, 
37 EMORY L. J. 721, 742 (1988). 
 200  See id. 
 201  See supra Part IV.A. 
 202  See supra Part IV.B.  
 203  See supra Part III.  
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and intense nature of surrogacy arrangements, a surrogate mother should not 
be able to waive her constitutional rights—including, but not limited to, the 
right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy and the right to 
control her medical treatment.204  As illustrated through case law, a surrogate 
mother may change her mind or disagree with the intended parents on 
decisions that she failed to contemplate prior to entering into the surrogacy 
agreement.205  Thus, if a surrogate mother refuses to comport with the 
requests of the intended parents, courts should contemplate the constitutional 
rights of the surrogate as a factor in the balancing test in order to decide 
whether to enforce the particular contractual provision. 
The second factor focuses on the safety concerns presented for the 
surrogate compared to the safety concerns presented for the developing fetus.  
Considering there are potentially higher safety concerns for the fetus 
compared to that of the surrogate, contractual provisions imposing 
obligations on the surrogate “to visit the doctor, to eat healthy, and to refrain 
from consuming substances such as drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes that could 
harm the developing fetus”206 appear to be reasonable.  If the safety concerns 
are comparably close, however, the court should err on the side of the 
surrogate.  This factor takes into account the degree of social concern for the 
developing infant, but continues to place the primacy on the surrogate’s 
autonomous rights. 
The third factor urges the courts to examine the degree and nature of 
the intrusion.  If the provision bears ample impingement on the surrogate’s 
bodily integrity then the court should not command its enforcement.  As 
noted, most commercial surrogacy contracts regulate when and with whom 
the surrogate can engage in sexual activity.207  This level of intrusion on 
privacy interests is justifiable for the first two weeks before and after embryo 
transfer; however, after this extent of time has passed, it would no longer be 
as compelling of a demand.  This factor provides a safeguard to ensure that 
intrusion upon the surrogate’s autonomous, decision-making rights is 
minimized. 
 The fourth factor contemplates the burden placed upon the surrogate 
mother to conform to the obligations contained in the surrogacy agreement.  
Courts should find fault with provisions that are cumbersome for the 
surrogate to comply with.  The analysis should weigh the minimal benefit to 
the fetus against the burden imposed on the surrogate.  For example, terms 
of an agreement stipulating that the surrogate mother must consume a vegan 
diet and eat only organic food can place an objectionably high burden on the 
 
 204  See supra Part III. 
 205  See supra Part II.A; see also supra Part III.A. 
 206  FIELD, supra note 57, at 66; see supra Part III.B.  
 207  Lahl, supra note 134. 
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surrogate, and courts should not enforce such terms.208 
The last factor that courts should take into consideration is the 
bargaining power of both parties at the time they entered into the agreement.  
To enforce a surrogacy contract, there should be a representation of 
meaningful choice and informed consent on the part of the contracting 
parties.  Locking a surrogate into rigid constraints entered into at the 
formation of the contract is to ignore the social and psychological realities 
of commercial surrogacy.  Strictly applying contractual provisions can 
conflict with issues of bodily integrity by attempting to confine a surrogate 
who failed to receive proper counseling or full disclosure before entering 
into the surrogacy agreement.  This would be contrary to public policy, and 
therefore, is an important factor for courts to consider. 
Courts should weigh the aforementioned factors against one another to 
determine the appropriate remedy if a dispute were to arise between the 
intended parents and the surrogate over a provision within the surrogacy 
contract.  Courts should recognize that a surrogate mother is placed in a 
unique situation where she is expected to submit to extremely precise, 
restrictive clauses that control nearly every aspect of her personal life 
without having the ability to stop performance in the middle of the 
contract.209  This balancing test provides a standard that allows courts to 
weigh the burdens of bodily intrusion against the benefits to the fetus.  
Intended parents should not have an unfettered ability to control or limit the 
surrogate’s behavior during the pregnancy by provisions in a surrogacy 
contract.  For example, the surrogacy agreement should not be able to force 
a surrogate to have an abortion.  The surrogate should retain the ability to do 
so, however, if it is in the best interest of her health.  Ultimately, this 
framework is designed to protect a surrogate’s bodily autonomy and her 
decision-making rights. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, states need to regulate surrogacy issues in order to 
protect a surrogate’s bodily autonomy during her pregnancy.  It is important 
that the autonomous rights of the surrogate are “reaffirmed so as to prevent 
intended parents from believing that by virtue of carrying a fetus for them, a 
surrogate is surrendering [all of] her constitutional rights to make decisions 
about her own body.”210  As an important starting position in determining 
their surrogacy laws, states need to focus on the rights of the surrogate.  
Legislation should impose ample restrictions on specific rights that cannot 
 
 208  See supra Part III.B.  
 209  See supra Part III. 
 210  Ohs, supra note 33, at 351.  
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be contracted away, as well as provide courts with a legal framework to 
determine the limitations of provisions that divest the surrogate of her 
autonomous, decision-making rights. 
 
